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SEWER SYNDICALISM: WORKER SELF-
MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SERVICES
Eric M. Fink*
Staat ist ein Verha¨ltnis, ist eine Beziehung zwischen den Menschen, ist eine Art, wie
die Menschen sich zu einander verhalten; und man zersto¨rt ihn, indem man andere
Beziehungen eingeht, indem man sich anders zu einander verha¨lt.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, municipal govern-
ments in various US cities assumed responsibility for utilities and other ser-
vices that previously had been privately operated. In the late twentieth century,
prompted by fiscal crisis and encouraged by neo-liberal ideology, governments
embraced the concept of “privatization,” shifting management and control over
public services2 to private entities.
Despite disagreements over the merits of privatization, both proponents
and opponents accept the premise of a fundamental distinction between the
“public” and “private” sectors, and between “state” and “market” institutions.
A more skeptical view questions the analytical soundness and practical signifi-
cance of these dichotomies. In this view, “privatization” is best understood as a
rhetorical strategy, part of a broader neo-liberal ideology that relies on putative
antinomies of “public” v. “private” and “state” v. “market” to obscure and rein-
force social and economic power relations.
While “privatization” may be an ideological definition of the situation, for
public service workers the difference between employment in the “public” and
“private” sectors can be real in its consequences3 for job security, compensa-
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1 Gustav Landauer, Schwache Staatsma¨nner, Schwa¨cheres Volk!, 12 DER SOZIALIST 89, 89
(1910), available at http://www.yumpu.com/de/document/view/9268493/der-sozialist-organ
-des-sozialistischen-bundes-02-jg-1910 (“The state is a relationship, a connection between
people, one way that people behave toward one another; and we destroy it by entering into
new relationships, by behaving differently toward one another.”).
2 For the sake of convenience, I use the term “public services” to refer to services that are
provided to the general public within a given locality, regardless of whether the provider of
those services is nominally a “public” or “private” entity.
3 Cf. WILLIAM I. THOMAS & DOROTHY SWAINE THOMAS, THE CHILD IN AMERICA: BEHAV-
IOR PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS 572 (1928) (“If men define situations as real, they are real in
their consequences.”).
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tion, and other respects. Yet, in both the “public” or “private” sectors, workers
labor under similar conditions of bureaucratic-managerial control, regardless of
whether the boss represents a government agency or private company. Against
these sibling forms of hierarchical control, this work posits the alternative of
“public service syndicalism,”4 under which workers themselves take responsi-
bility for managing public service operations.
Worker self-management5 in public services has been rare in the United
States. But examples, both here and elsewhere, do exist. Most recently, the
British government, as part of its “Big Society” agenda, has pursued the crea-
tion of employee-run public service “mutuals.” Critics within the labor move-
ment and the left have regarded that initiative with suspicion, seeing it as an
effort to continue a neo-liberal agenda under the guise of worker empower-
ment. Yet, the fact that a center-right British government has at least embraced
4 The term public service syndicalism is used here as a shorthand for a model of public
service delivery through entities directly controlled and managed by workers (“public ser-
vice syndicates”). See Kenneth Casebeer, Community Syndicalism for the United States:
Preliminary Observations on Law and Globalization in Democratic Production 5 (Miami
Law Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2011-36, 2011), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=1966172 (defining “community syndicalism” as a system of “local commu-
nity start-up finance and operating credit for industrial production combined with democratic
worker ownership and control of production”). The choice of nomenclature consciously links
the call for public service syndicalism to radical currents within the labor movement empha-
sizing direct worker control over the workplace. See Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The
Progressive History of Organizational “Real Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 618
(1989) (“Syndicalism’s central ambition was to achieve direct and democratic worker con-
trol of industrial management decisions.”); Tom Brown, Principles of Syndicalism, LIBCOM
.ORG (Nov. 27, 2006, 4:08 PM), http://libcom.org/library/principles-of-syndicalism-tom
-brown (this material was originally published as a series of articles in WAR COMMENTARY
FOR ANARCHISM in 1943) (defining “Syndicalism” as “a theory and movement of trade
unionism . . . in which all means of production and distribution are brought under the direct
control of their workers by the use of direct action, and organized through federations of
labor unions; direct political and economic democracy in the workplace and community
organized through labor unions and federations, including the abolition of capitalism, social
classes, parliamentary government, bureaucracy and political parties”); Gaylord Wilshire,
Syndicalism: What It Is, LIBCOM.ORG (Dec. 30, 2007, 3:58 PM), http://libcom.org/library
/syndicalism-what-it (this work was originally published as a pamphlet in 1912 in London by
Twentieth Century Press) (“The essence of Syndicalism is the control by the workers them-
selves, be they intellectual or manual, of the conditions of their own work.”).
5 I use the terms “worker self-management” and “worker control” interchangeably in this
work. Cf. Sam Dolgoff, Workers’ Control vs Workers’ Self-Management, in THE ANARCH-
IST COLLECTIVES: WORKERS SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE SPANISH REVOLUTION 1936–1939
app. at 81 (Sam Dolgoff ed., 1974) (distinguishing “workers’ control” (“a strictly limited
area of decision-making power, a voice—at best secondary—in the control of the conditions
of the work place”) from “workers’ self-management” (“the organization of all workers in
the work place into a workers’ council or factory committee . . . which makes all the deci-
sions formerly made by the owners and managers”)). The form of public service syndicalism
envisioned here is closer to Dolgoff’s conception of “worker self-management” in its opera-
tion, though the idea of implementing this form through legal and policy intervention by the
state will no doubt be met with skepticism by orthodox syndicalists. See id. (identifying
“self-management” as “the very process by which the workers themselves overthrow their
managers and take on their own management and the management of production in their
own work place”). See also Wilshire, supra note 4 (“Instead of the State giving industrial
control to the workers, as the Socialists fondly hope, the Syndicalists look to the workers
taking such control and giving it to the community.”).
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the language of worker control in public services suggests that similar experi-
mentation may be politically feasible in the United States as well.
II. THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENDULUM
Over the course of the past hundred or so years, the management of public
services has passed back-and-forth between government and private entities. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the dominant trend was toward
government responsibility for services. In the late twentieth century, a reverse
trend of privatization gained momentum. In the early twenty-first century, the
picture has been mixed, with both continued privatization in some areas and a
return to government operation in others.
A. Municipalization
While municipal government in the United States directly provided some
public services in colonial times,6 the general pattern began with private actors
providing services under government regulation, evolving into a system of
“direct public subcontracting” in the early nineteenth century, before giving
way to direct municipal provision in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.7
The early twentieth century municipal governments that assumed respon-
sibility for public utilities and services represented the local face of the Social-
ist8 and Progressive9 movements. The differing ideologies of these movements
appealed to different core constituencies: Socialists, rooted in the industrial
working class and organized labor movement,10 were devoted to abolishing
6 Edward L. Glaeser, Public Ownership in the American City 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8613, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8613
(noting that, under English colonial rule, “water, fire and sanitation were the primary respon-
sibilities of the earliest government of New York, the Common Council”).
7 Id. at 31–32 (reviewing history of sanitation services in New York); id. at 32–33 (street
paving); id. at 33–37 (mass transit). See also Paul Jerome Raver, Municipal Ownership in
the Last Five Years, 9 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 121, 121 n.1 (1933) (citing “rapid
growth in the number and size of municipal enterprises” between 1912 and 1917); Thomas
F. Campbell, Municipal Ownership, ENCYCLOPEDIA CLEVELAND HIST., http://ech.case.edu
/cgi/article.pl?id=MO (last modified July 21, 1997, 1:13 PM).
8 The leading example here is Milwaukee under Mayors Emil Seidel and Daniel Hoan. See
ELMER AXEL BECK, THE SEWER SOCIALISTS: A HISTORY OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF WIS-
CONSIN 1897–1940, at 68, 140 (1982). For other examples, see generally RICHARD W. JUDD,
SOCIALIST CITIES: MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND THE GRASS ROOTS OF AMERICAN SOCIALISM
(1989); SOCIALISM AND THE CITIES (Bruce M. Stave ed., 1975).
9 A leading example is Cleveland Mayor Tom Johnson. See generally EUGENE C. MUR-
DOCH, TOM JOHNSON OF CLEVELAND (1994); Robert H. Bremner, The Civic Revival in Ohio:
Reformed Businessman: Tom L. Johnson, 8 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 299 (1949). For other
examples, see MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY: MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRA-
TION AND REFORM IN AMERICA 1880–1920, at 81–83 (1977).
10 See JUDD, supra note 8, at 29–35. In some cities, municipal Socialists also drew support,
at least temporarily, from middle-class, business-oriented reformers, forming coalitions
based on shared concerns about corruption and inefficiency in local government. See id. at
22–23, 36–40.
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industrial capitalism in favor of a “Cooperative Commonwealth.”11 Progres-
sives, rooted in the professional and managerial middle-class, accepted indus-
trial capitalism and sought merely to ameliorate its more adverse consequences
through regulation and reform.12
Yet, in practice, municipal Socialists and Progressives pursued similar
agendas in office, most notably the public ownership of utilities and expansion
of services.13 For Progressives, the primary motivations were concerns over
11 James R. Green, The “Salesmen-Soldiers” of the Appeal “Army”: A Profile of Rank-and
File Socialist Agitators, in SOCIALISM AND THE CITIES, supra note 8, at 13, 34–35; JUDD,
supra note 8, at 32, 35; William C. Pratt, “Jimmie Higgins” and the Reading Socialist
Community: An Exploration of the Socialist Rank and File, in SOCIALISM AND THE CITIES,
supra note 8, at 141, 144. See also Walter Lippman, On Municipal Socialism, 1913: An
Analysis of Problems and Strategies, in SOCIALISM AND THE CITIES, supra note 8, at 184,
189 (criticizing his fellow Socialists for “assum[ing] that we alone represent every step in
progress from personal honesty to the Cooperative Commonwealth”). The idea of the “coop-
erative commonwealth” originated among utopian socialists in the nineteenth century, who
established independent communities, organized on socialist principles, in an attempt to live
and promote their vision of society. JOHN CURL, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE: UNCOVERING THE
HIDDEN HISTORY OF COOPERATION, COOPERATIVE MOVEMENTS, AND COMMUNALISM IN
AMERICA 57–58 (2d ed. 2009) (associating “the idea of a cooperative commonwealth” with
the “Rochdale cooperative movement” originating in mid-nineteenth century England and
spreading to America in the 1860s); see Edward W. Bemis, Coo¨peration in New England, in
6 HISTORY OF COOPERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 17, 17 (Herbert B. Adams ed., 1888)
(identifying Brook Farm Community as early example “an attempt (1842-6) to form a
coo¨perative commonwealth”). See also LAURENCE GRONLUND, THE COOPERATIVE COMMON-
WEALTH IN ITS OUTLINES: AN EXPOSITION OF MODERN SOCIALISM 102 (1884). The Knights
of Labor expressly declared the aim of “transform[ing] the country into what they came to
call a Cooperative Commonwealth” by “establish[ing] co-operative institutions such as will
tend to supersede the wage-system, by the introduction of a co-operative industrial system.”
CURL, supra at 4, 87. Significantly, the Knights also called for “public ownership of rail-
roads and other commercial transport; of telegraph and telephones, water systems and utili-
ties.” Id. at 87–88. A call the Socialist Party would take up and put into practice in several
cities in the early twentieth century. See JUDD, supra note 8, at 20–23.
12 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 5, 227–38
(1955); ARTHUR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1910–1917, at
1–2, 18–19 (1954).
13 See Gail Radford, From Municipal Socialism to Public Authorities: Institutional Factors
in the Shaping of American Public Enterprise, 90 J. AM. HIST. 863, 866 (2003) (identifying
municipal socialists and Progressives as part of “a broader political tendency in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries” pursuing “the agenda of public ownership”).
Indeed, the similar approach to municipal government by Socialist and Progressive adminis-
trations was a subject of criticism from within the Socialist camp. Critics viewed the reform-
ist agenda, including the focus on municipal utilities and services, as a distraction from the
cause of overcoming capitalism. See, e.g., Lippman, supra note 11, at 184, 185–89 (criticiz-
ing Socialist administrations in Milwaukee and Schenectedy for failing to “keep themselves
clearly distinguished from the progressives”); Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., Tribune of the
People: George R. Lunn and the Rise and Fall of Christian Socialism in Schenectady, in
SOCIALISM AND THE CITIES, supra note 8, at 72, 85–86 (discussing Lippman’s criticism).
Shortly after castigating municipal Socialists for pursing a reformist agenda, Lippman him-
self would abandon socialism in favor of progressive reform. Id.; ARTHUR MANN, LA
GUARDIA COMES TO POWER: 1933, at 106–07 (1965) (citing Lippman’s support for Fiorello
La Guardia’s 1933 mayoral campaign, which united middle-class “good government”
reformers with labor unions and working class voters).
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corruption and inefficiency associated with private contractors.14 Socialists
shared these concerns, viewing efficient public services as a means to improve
the health and living conditions of working class residents.15 They also
believed that well-functioning Socialist-run cities could provide a working
model for a post-capitalist society:
The Socialist urban utopia entailed democratic ownership and control of public utili-
ties, bakeries, ice houses, coal and wood yards, department stores, slaughter houses,
and many other things, all guided by the spirit of community cooperation. . . . Jobs
would be provided for the unemployed; free medical care for the aged; public baths,
laundries, parks, and playgrounds for the people. Socialists planned to build a show-
place, an example of government run by and for the working people.16
Early twentieth century municipal reforms left a legacy of sanitation sys-
tems, water and power utilities, parks and recreation facilities, and other ameni-
ties that continued to operate under municipal control long after the Progressive
and Socialist administrations that created them were a distant memory.17
Before the century’s end, however, economic and ideological developments
would threaten this legacy.
B. Privatization
During the last decades of the twentieth century, prompted in part by fiscal
crisis18 and encouraged by an ascendant ideology of neo-liberalism,19 a trend
14 See Glaeser, supra note 6, at 6–13, 40. Cleveland mayor Newton Baker expressed this
motivation in opining that “the movement for municipal ownership in the United States is
the direct and immediate fruit of the misconduct of privately owned public utilities.” Newton
D. Baker, Municipal Ownership, 57 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 188, 188 (1915).
George Stewart Brown, then a Baltimore city council member, explained support for munici-
pal ownership among “Progressive Democrats” as resting on three beliefs: “(1) that competi-
tion in the public services is impracticable; (2) that municipal ownership will pay, either in
cash savings to the taxpayer or in cheaper and better service; (3) that municipal ownership is
a political necessity, and will remove the main and most threatening source of political cor-
ruption.” George Stewart Brown, Municipal Ownership of Public Utilities, 182 N. AM. REV.
701, 701 (1906); Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Brown, George Stewart, FED.
JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=3303&cid=999&ctype=na&instate
=na (last visited Mar. 12, 2014) (identifying Baltimore City Council service).
15 JUDD, supra note 8, at 22, 30. It was the devotion to unglamorous but efficient public
utilities gave rise to the sobriquet “sewer socialists.” See LOUIS WALDMAN, LABOR LAWYER
260 (1944) (crediting New York Socialist leader Morris Hillquit with coining the phrase
“sewer socialism” as a term of derision aimed at Milwaukee Mayor Dan Hoan); see also
Bruce M. Stave, The Great Depression and Urban Political Continuity: Bridgeport Chooses
Socialism, in SOCIALISM AND THE CITIES, supra note 8, at 157, 176 (citing sewage treatment
system established in Bridgeport, Connecticut under Socialist Mayor Jasper McLevy as “the
classic example of ‘sewer socialism’ ”). The term has come to be used more favorably to
describe the practical accomplishments of municipal Socialists. See, e.g., Joel Kotkin, Edito-
rial, Sewer Socialism: Cities Need a Back-to-Basics Strategy. Catering to Art-Loving Yup-
pies Just Won’t Work., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2004, at M1, available at http://articles.latimes
.com/2004/sep/12/opinion/op-kotkin12.
16 JUDD, supra note 8, at 32.
17 See Radford, supra note 13, at 867.
18 See Igor Vojnovic, Government and Urban Management in the 20th Century: Policies,
Contradictions, and Weaknesses of the New Right, 69 GEOJOURNAL 271, 275 (2007). On the
impact of state fiscal crisis on government policy in the 1970s, see generally JAMES
O’CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE (1973); CLAUS OFFE, CONTRADICTIONS OF THE
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ208.txt unknown Seq: 6 30-APR-14 10:47
Spring 2014] SEWER SYNDICALISM 449
emerged toward shifting management and control of public services to the pri-
vate sector.20 Privatization21 has taken various forms, ranging from contracting
with private entities to operate and manage certain aspects of services, to sell-
ing off services entirely to private organizations.22
At the municipal level, privatization reached its peak in the late 1990s.23
By that time, a substantial majority of cities had engaged in at least some form
of privatization, affecting about one-fifth of municipal services overall.24 While
nearly all types of service have been subject to some form of privatization, the
extent has varied among different types of service.25
Perhaps symbolizing the high-water mark of the privatization wave, in the
late 1990s the City of Milwaukee privatized its municipal sewage system, the
very embodiment of “sewer socialism.”26 More recently, Milwaukee also con-
sidered, but ultimately abandoned, a proposal to privatize its water service.27
The fate of water privatization in Milwaukee is consistent with recent trends,
WELFARE STATE (John Keane ed., 1984); Fred Block, The Fiscal Crisis of the Capitalist
State, 7 ANN. REV. SOC. 1 (1981).
19 See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 160 (2007).
20 JOHN QUIGGIN, ZOMBIE ECONOMICS: HOW DEAD IDEAS STILL WALK AMONG US 179–82
(2010); David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
SOC. SCI. 22, 35–36 (2007) [hereinafter Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction]; Vojnovic,
supra note 18, at 278; Amir Hefetz & Mildred E. Warner, Dynamics of Service Provision:
Service, Market and Place Characteristics 13 (Milan European Econ. Workshops, Working
Paper No. 2010-33, 2010), available at http://wp.demm.unimi.it/tl_files/wp/2010/DEMM
-2010_033wp.pdf [hereinafter Dynamics of Service Provision].
21 The term “privatization” is often attributed to business writer Peter Drucker, who argued
for “reprivatization” of functions that government had assumed from the private sector
beginning in the late nineteenth century. See Germa` Bel, The Coining of “Privatization” and
Germany’s National Socialist Party, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2006, at 187, 187–88 (citing
various sources crediting Peter Drucker, THE AGE OF DISCONTINUITY (1969) with originating
the term “privatization”). Drucker’s work was certainly influential in popularizing the term
and the concept to which it refers in the 1970s and ’80s. Id. at 189 (noting influence of
Drucker’s work on economic policy). But the term “privatization” itself pre-dates Drucker’s
work by several decades. Bel traces it back to discussions of German economic policy in the
1930s and ’40s. Id. at 189–91.
22 See Leonard Gilroy, Local Government Privatization 101, REASON FOUND. (Mar. 16,
2010), http://reason.org/news/show/local-government-privatization-101.
23 See Dynamics of Service Provision, supra note 20, at 4.
24 Robert Jay Dilger et al., Privatization of Municipal Services in America’s Largest Popu-
lation Cities, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 21, 21–22 (1997) (citing variation among cities in defini-
tions of privatization and measures of its extent); Dynamics of Service Provision, supra note
20, at 4; Mildred Warner & Amir Hefetz, Privatization and Reverse Privatization in US
Local Government Service Delivery 2002–2007, at 3 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter Privatization
and Reverse Privatization] (conference paper) (on file with author).
25 Privatization and Reverse Privatization, supra note 24, at 3, 14.
26 Alan J. Borsuk, Is ‘Sewer Socialism’ All Washed Up?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 14,
1997, at B1; Roger Bybee, Sewer Socialism Down the Drain?, IN THESE TIMES (July 10,
2009), http://inthesetimes.com/article/4544/sewer_socialism_down_the_drain/.
27 Dan Egan & Larry Sandler, Can Water Keep City Budget Afloat?: Leaders Weigh Priva-
tization’s Revenue Against Loss of Control, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 25, 2009, at A1,
available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/45969117.html; Public Opposition
Prevented the Privatization of Milwaukee’s Drinking Water System, FOOD & WATER WATCH
(Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/studies/milwaukee-wi/; Bybee, supra
note 26.
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which have seen “reverse contracting” (i.e. governments reassuming direct
responsibility for previously outsourced services) matching or outpacing
privatizations.28
There is an extensive body of scholarship on privatization, taking a variety
of analytical approaches and offering variously favorable and critical apprais-
als.29 Despite the differences, this work generally shares one notable common
feature: an inattention to public service workers. While “taxpayers,” “consum-
ers,” and “the public at large” are typically identified as relevant “stakeholders”
in privatization decisions,30 the workers engaged in providing services are
mostly absent, appearing only indirectly in claims that civil service rules and
public-sector unions impair the efficiency of government-provided services.31
There is little discussion about the effect of privatization on workers, and no
consideration of workers’ potential role in service management.
For public service workers, privatization may entail a loss of job protec-
tion,32 reduced wages or benefits,33 and otherwise less-favorable working con-
ditions as compared to public employment. For the labor movement, which in
the United States has become increasingly concentrated in the public sector,34
privatization threatens a loss of membership and strength.35 Consequently, pub-
28 Privatization and Reverse Privatization, supra note 24, at 3; see also Diane Cardwell,
Power to the People, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2013, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/03/14/business/energy-environment/cities-weigh-taking-electricity-business
-from-private-utilities.html.
29 For a review of this literature, see Chris Sagers, The Myth of “Privatization”, 59 ADMIN.
L. REV. 37, 43–55 (2007).
30 Otieno Mbare, The Role of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the New Economy,
ELECTRONIC J. BUS. ETHICS & ORG. STUD., http://ejbo.jyu.fi/articles/0901_5.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2014).
31 See, e.g., Sergio Fernandez et al., Employment, Privatization, and Managerial Choice:
Does Contracting Out Reduce Public Sector Employment?, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT.
57, 59 (2007); Lawrence H. White, Privatization of Municipally-Provided Services, 2 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 187, 189–90 (1978) (citing civil service rules and public employee
unions as impediments to productivity in public services); Tad DeHaven, Privatizing the
U.S. Postal Service, DOWNSIZING THE FED. GOV’T, CATO INST. 3 (Nov. 2010), http://www
.downsizinggovernment.org/usps (arguing that wages, benefits, and work rules under union
contracts reduce efficiency in US Postal Service).
32 See Richard Michael Fischl, “Running Government Like a Business”: Wisconsin and the
Assault on Workplace Democracy, YALE L.J. ONLINE 47 (June 21, 2011), http://yalelaw
journal.org/images/pdfs/996.pdf [hereinafter Running Government Like a Business] (noting
greater job security for public employees compared to private sector).
33 Dilger et al., supra note 24, at 24.
34 The most recent figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show an overall union mem-
bership rate of 11.3 percent, with a rate of 35.9 percent in the public sector compared with
only 6.6 percent in the private sector. While the total number of employees in the private
sector (107.2 million) is about five times greater than in the public sector (20.4 million),
public-sector union members (7.3 million) now outnumber their private-sector counterparts
(7.0 million). News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Mem-
bers—2012 (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01232013
.pdf. See also Running Government Like a Business, supra note 32, at 44 (citing 2010
Bureau of Labor Statistics figures).
35 Indeed, the opportunity to weaken public sector unions has been among the motivations
for privatization. See QUIGGIN, supra note 20, at 182–83.
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lic employees and labor unions have generally been strong opponents of
privatization.
III. A CRITIQUE OF PRIVATIZATION AS PURE IDEOLOGY
Proponents and opponents of privatization alike share a core assumption:
“that there is some distinction between the performance of certain functions by
government institutions and performance by private ones, and . . . that the dis-
tinction is both real and of very deep significance.”36 Yet, for both socio-legal
analysts and service workers, the public-private dichotomy may be a distinction
with limited difference, bearing neither the normative weight it carries in juris-
prudential theory, nor the analytical weight it carries in economic argument.37
As a practical matter,
the basic choice in the organization of society is not between organization by govern-
ment bureaucracy on one hand, and markets on the other—a choice that is assumed
in the privatization literature. Rather, the basic choice is between two kinds of
bureaucracy, which really do not differ much at all.38
This is particularly true from the perspective of workers. Under both gov-
ernment and private management, employees carry out tasks assigned by, and
under the supervision and control of, managers39 who are appointed by, and
ultimately accountable to, capital asset owners.40 In their day-to-day exper-
iences on the job, public and private sector employees alike have little if any
self-determination.41
36 Sagers, supra note 29, at 38.
37 Id. at 41. See also Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor
Distinction, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 147 (2012) (noting the “deep similarity” between
direct government management of public services and management by private contractors,
and arguing that there is no “non-contingent distinction between the two types of agents”).
38 Sagers, supra note 29, at 38. Cf. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 956 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (observing that
“bureaucracy” represents the characteristic organizational form of both the modern state
agency and the modern business enterprise).
39 A crucial defining feature of bureaucratic organization is the “principle of office hierar-
chy” entailing “a clearly established system of super- and subordination in which there is a
supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.” WEBER, supra note 38, at 957 (empha- R
sis omitted); see also id. at 980 (“The bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with the
concentration of the material means of management in the hands of the master.”). Weber
emphasizes that “[i]t does not matter for the character of bureaucracy whether its authority is
called ‘private’ or ‘public.’ ” Id. at 957.
40 See GREGORY K. DOW, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS’ CONTROL IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 4–5 (2003).
41 See Running Government Like a Business, supra note 32, at 40 (arguing that the lack of
“a genuine voice in important decisions about their work lives and the power to make that
voice heard” typifies the situation of employees in the United States). See also id. at 54–55
(quoting employees of the federal Transportation Security Administration who cite unilateral
managerial control and the lack of “voice on the job” as a primary motivation for seeking
union representation). To be sure, there are meaningful differences between public- and pri-
vate-sector employment. Most significantly, unlike private-sector workers, who (outside the
dwindling unionized segment of the workforce) can typically be fired at-will, public-sector
workers generally enjoy some protection against arbitrary discharge. See id. at 47–50. Pub-
lic-sector workers are also far less likely to face strong resistance from their employers when
they seek to organize a labor union. Id. at 53.
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That is not to say that the public-private distinction lacks any socio-legal
significance. To the contrary, it “plays an important legitimating role in society
and . . . conceals prevalent and very significant maldistributions of power.”42
As Karl Klare explains, “[t]he primary effect of the public/private distinction is
. . . to inhibit the perception that the institutions in which we live are the prod-
uct of human design and can therefore be changed.”43 In the realm of work, the
legitimate role of the public-private distinction plays out in the beliefs “that
industry and commerce can only function on a largely authoritarian basis,” and
that “the basic principles of democracy do not apply in the workplace.”44
This ideological function hides behind the typical framing of privatization
as a merely neutral technocratic device for achieving economic efficiency and
enhanced performance in existing programs and services.45 Yet, privatization
also has the “potential to rearrange policy landscapes and to affect underlying
distributions of power among democratic actors and institutions.”46 In this
sense, privatization is not a value-free economic tool, but very much a political
strategy, facilitating substantive changes in policy goals and outcomes, without
the same checks and balances, oversight, and accountability that apply to gov-
ernment agencies.47
From this perspective, privatization is best understood as one element of
the multifaceted project of neo-liberalism,48 which has held hegemonic sway
over political, economic, and legal discourse and practices for more than three
decades.49 In concrete terms, neo-liberalism “is a shorthand term used to
denote a particular set of economic and political policy proposals”, notably
“free trade, privatization, reduced government spending, and deregulation of
capital flows.”50 Neoliberalism’s broader significance, however, is ideological:
a set of “cultural conceptions that governments and financial agencies attempt
to apply and enforce along with and through economic and political
practices.”51
In this broader ideological sense, neo-liberalism represents a “sophisti-
cated class struggle on the part of the upper strata [in society] to restore . . .
42 Sagers, supra note 29, at 41.
43 Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358,
1417 (1982).
44 Id.
45 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 717–18 (2010)
(“The case for privatization . . . has centered on its technocratic promise of efficiency and
cost savings . . . .”).
46 Id. at 722.
47 Id. at 718–19.
48 See HARVEY, supra note 19 (identifying privatization as one of “four main features” of
capitalist “accumulation by dispossession” under neoliberalism); id. at 65 (“Neoliberals are
particularly assiduous in seeking the privatization of [state-owned] assets.”).
49 See Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, supra note 20, at 27–29. As Harvey explains, R
for a “system of thought to become dominant” its “fundamental concepts . . . become so
deeply embedded in commonsense understandings that they are taken for granted and
beyond question.” Id. at 24.
50 Karen Ann Faulk, If They Touch One of Us, They Touch All of Us: Cooperativism as a
Counterlogic to Neoliberal Capitalism, 81 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 579, 587 (2008).
51 Id.
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class dominance.”52 Neo-liberalism asserts that the only legitimate social insti-
tution is the market, and that the only legitimate social actor is the individual,
particularly the individual as consumer.53 There is no room, in the neo-liberal
worldview, for non-market institutions or collective action. Within that
worldview, privatization appears a “common sense” solution, because any
alternative is either conceived to be inherently and irredeemably deficient (as
with public services administered by government and staffed by public employ-
ees organized and represented through unions) or utterly beyond the conceptual
pale (as with public services administered and staffed by self-managing work-
ers themselves). In turn, the practice of privatization bolsters the hegemony of
neo-liberal ideology, by further delegitimizing non-market collective-action
modes of service provision.54
IV. BEYOND “PUBLIC” V. “PRIVATE”: WORKER SELF-MANAGEMENT AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO BUREAUCRATIC-MANAGERIALISM
A venerable radical tradition has long advocated for direct control and
management of productive enterprises by workers themselves.55 This tradition
emphatically rejects “the belief that employees lack the capacity collectively to
organize and govern complex industrial enterprises.”56
The argument for worker control is two-fold. Most immediately, self-man-
agement is a more democratic alternative to both privately-owned and state-
owned modes of bureaucratic-managerial control.57 More broadly, the exercise
52 Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, supra note 20, at 41.
53 Id. at 22–23.
54 COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM 21 (2011) (likewise iden-
tifies privatization as a core element of neo-liberalism). Consistent with the suggestion that
the public/private distinction is less fundamental than commonly supposed, see supra notes
37– 38 and accompanying text, Crouch argues that “privatization” and “marketization” of
public services under neo-liberalism has not, in practice, transferred responsibility and con-
trol to a truly private market. CROUCH, supra. Rather, what passes for “privatization” com-
monly entails a hybrid structure, under which government relies on private entities to finance
and manage public services, through contractual arrangements that permit the private con-
tractors to pocket service revenues while insulating both the private contractors and the gov-
ernmental authorities from meaningful accountability through either the democratic process
or market discipline. Id. at 94–96.
55 There is extensive literature on the ideology and practice of worker control and self-
management. A few notable entries in this genre include: THE ANARCHIST COLLECTIVES:
WORKERS SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE SPANISH REVOLUTION 1936–1939 (Sam Dolgoff ed.,
1974); DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS’ CONTROL IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
WORK, TECHNOLOGY, AND LABOR STRUGGLES (1979); GEOFFREY OSTERGAARD, THE TRADI-
TION OF WORKERS’ CONTROL (1997); OURS TO MASTER AND TO OWN: WORKERS’ CONTROL
FROM THE COMMUNE TO THE PRESENT (Immanuel Ness & Dario Azzellini eds., 2011);
ANTON PANNEKOEK, WORKERS’ COUNCILS (Robert F. Barsky ed., 2002); RICHARD WOLFF,
DEMOCRACY AT WORK: A CURE FOR CAPITALISM (2012).
56 See Klare, supra note 43.
57 See DOW, supra note 40, at 27–32 (discussing democracy as normative basis for worker
control). Without going so far as syndicalists or Marxists in seeking the abolition of capital-
ist forms of enterprise, progressive reformers likewise seek to promote workplace democracy
by institutionalizing “a . . . labor voice in . . . corporate and workplace governance” through
“works councils,” “codetermination,” and the like. Richard Michael Fischl, Labor Law, the
Left, and the Lure of the Market, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 947, 951–52 (2011); see also Kenneth
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of worker control within particular enterprises is a prefiguative practice for
attaining the goal of “building a new world within the shell of the old.”58 In this
dual sense, worker control “operates as a counterlogic to the individualized and
materialist conception of citizenship promoted by neoliberal capitalism.”59
A. Worker Control in Theory
Dow offers a comprehensive theoretical and empirical assessment of
worker control as an alternative mode of firm governance.60 He distinguishes
four ideal-types of firm governance, based on two structural-functional dimen-
sions: ownership of capital assets, and control over production.61 Along the
first dimension, the distinction is between “private” and “public” ownership.62
Along the second dimension, the distinction is between control by providers of
capital (i.e. owners) and control by providers of labor (i.e. workers).63 In this
typology, a capital-managed firm is “capitalist” if assets are privately owned
and “socialist” if assets are publicly owned, while a labor-managed firm is
“laborist” if assets are privately owned and “self-managed” if assets are pub-
licly owned.64
G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for Compre-
hensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 804 (2011); see also DOW, supra note 40, at 83–91
(discussing codetermination).
58 See, e.g., Alberto R. Bonnet, The Political Form at Last Discovered: Workers’ Councils
Against the Capitalist State, in OURS TO MASTER AND TO OWN, supra note 55, at 66, 66
(arguing that “the workers’ council showed an inherent potential to overcome the division
between the economic and the political spheres,” and thus a means of “overcoming the capi-
talist state itself.”); Sheila Cohen, The Red Mole: Workers’ Councils as a Means of Revolu-
tionary Transformation, in OURS TO MASTER AND TO OWN, supra note 55, at 48, 49
(“[T]hese worker-generated structures simultaneously challenge the capitalist state and cre-
ate the potential template for a new, worker-run society organized along the same directly
democratic, accountable lines.”); Donny Gluckstein, Workers’ Councils in Europe: A Cen-
tury of Experience, in OURS TO MASTER AND TO OWN, supra note 55, at 32, 33 (“[W]orkers’
councils . . . provide a glimpse of an alternative to capitalism” and “represent a transition to
the future, constituting a radically different kind of power.”); PANNEKOEK, supra note 55, at
pt. 1, § 7, available at http://libcom.org/library/workers-councils-1-pannekoek (“The work-
ers’ councils are the form of self-government which in the times to come will replace the
forms of government of the old world.”); Antonio Gramsci, Unions and Councils, http://
www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1919/10/unions-councils.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014)
(Trans. Michael Carley, originally published in L’Ordine Nuovo on Oct. 11, 1919) (“The
factory council is the model of the proletarian state.”); see also MICHAEL FIELDING & PETER
MOSS, RADICAL EDUCATION AND THE COMMON SCHOOL: A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE 149
(2011) (discussing “prefigurative practice” and citing “the syndicalist phrase, ‘to build a new
world in the shell of the old’”).
59 See Faulk, supra note 50, at 608–09 (discussing worker cooperatives in the Argentine
“recuperated businesses movement”).
60 See generally DOW, supra note 40.
61 Id. at 2–3.
62 Id.
63 Id. Dow’s analysis proceeds from a neo-institutionalist conception of “a firm . . . as a set
of incomplete contracts among input suppliers,” within which “the right to make decisions
not previously determined by contracts must be assigned to some person or group.” Id. at
4–5 (assigning residual control rights is the focus of the second dimension in Dow’s
typology).
64 Id. at 3 tbl.1.1.
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The discourse of privatization typically presumes that, regardless of
whether service operations are in public or private hands, control rights will be
exercised by management on behalf of asset owners. That is, the choice is pre-
sumed to be between control by government managers (in cases where govern-
ment directly provides services) or control by private managers (in cases where
government sells, leases, or contracts for management of service operation).
Dow’s formulation highlights the option of worker self-management as an
alternative to both state-managed and privatized services. In this respect, he
echoes a longstanding radical-left critique of government ownership as an
incomplete and inadequate alternative to capitalist exploitation of labor.65
Reviewing and critiquing the most common normative justifications for
worker control, Dow66 suggests that the most persuasive are those based on the
values of dignity and community.67 The authoritarian nature of traditional
employment relations, whether in the private or public sector, undermines these
values.68 In contrast, worker self-management enhances the dignity of workers
by liberating them from subaltern status, and nurtures solidarity among workers
by restructuring their work within a social relation of mutual responsibility.69
In the dominant conception of a “public-private distinction,” the work-
place is located in the “private” sphere, where “public” values like dignity and
community are inapplicable. Dow’s argument for extending these values into
the workplace implicitly rejects the public-private bifurcation, and instead rec-
ognizes that the workplace is not sharply bounded-off from other sites of social
existence:
[P]eople care about social relationships apart from their consequences for individual
welfare . . . . Employment may be only one dimension of life, but it is an important
one; sanctions may not involve the firing squad, but being fired is painful; and nor-
65 See, e.g., Bonnet, supra note 58, at 72 (noting distinction “between the socialization of
the product . . . and the socialization of the production process”). For Korsch, the attempt to
implement “socialization” through “statization” (under the Social Democratic leadership in
post-WWI Germany, or under municipal sewer socialist administrations in the US) repre-
sented only a “simple change of employer.” Id. at 73. “The worker as such,” Korsch argued,
“doesn’t win more freedom; his way of life and work won’t be more humanized because the
manager appointed by the owners of private capital is replaced by an official appointed by
the state government or the municipal administration.” Id. at 74; see also ISTV ´AN M´ESZ ´AROS,
BEYOND CAPITAL: TOWARDS A THEORY OF TRANSITION xvii (1995) (identifying “the social-
ist mode of control, through the self-management of the associated producers” as an alterna-
tive to both the “global capitalist” and “Stalinist Soviet” systems); Wilshire, supra note 4
(“The Syndicalist views both nationalisation and municipalisation of industry with more or
less indifference.”).
66 DOW, supra note 40, at 23–44.
67 Id. at 36.
68 See id. (“The fundamental problem is that such firms involve a unidirectional authority
relationship between a boss and subordinate, where one commands and the other obeys.
Such master-servant relationships are by their nature not conducive to dignity or self-respect
on the part of the subordinate.”).
69 Cf. Gramsci, supra note 58. (“[C]ollaboration to produce well and usefully develops soli-
darity, multiplies the links of affection and fraternity. Everyone is indispensable, everyone is
at their post, and everyone has a function and a post. . . . The existence of the council gives
workers the direct responsibility of production, it draws them to improving the work, instills
a conscious and voluntary discipline, creates the psychology of the producer, of the creator
of history.”).
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mally it is hard to turn down a job if one doesn’t know when the next offer will
arrive. Under these circumstances, the relational aspects of unaccountable authority
appear morally suspect, and encouragement of more [labor managed firms] (or even
an outright ban on [capital managed firms]) might seem to be an appropriate
response.70
B. Worker Control in Practice
There has been only limited experience with worker-run public services in
the United States. Outside the United States, worker control in public services
has been put into practice in at least two significant, and very different, cases:
in Spain during the civil war of 1936–39, and in Great Britain under the current
Conservative/Liberal-Democrat coalition government’s Big Society program.
1. Worker-Run Public Services in the United States
The most fertile ground for experiments in worker-controlled public ser-
vices in the United States has been in public education. Several teacher-run
schools have been established, in some cases with the support of local teachers
unions.71 Such schools currently operate in large cities including New York,72
Los Angeles,73 Detroit,74 Milwaukee,75 Boston,76 and Newark,77 and in
smaller districts like LeSueur-Henderson, Minnesota.78
70 DOW, supra note 40, at 40.
71
 Winnie Hu, In a New Role, Teachers Move to Run Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/education/07teachers.html?pagewan
ted=all&_r=1&.
72 UFT CHARTER SCHOOL, http://www.uftcharterschool.net/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
The UFT Charter School has faced threats of closure over poor performance, but UFT
recently received approval to remain open, conditioned on making improvements over the
next two years. See Beth Fertig, Teacher Union’s Charter Wins Two-Year Reprieve, WNYC
(Mar. 13, 2014, 1:53 PM), http://www.wnyc.org/story/301878-teacher-unions-charter
-school-wins-two-year-reprieve/. See also Hu, supra note 71.
73 Charter Schools Iced, Los Angeles Teachers Win Bids To Run New Schools, LABOR
NOTES (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.labornotes.org/blogs/2010/02/charter-schools-iced-los
-angeles-teachers-win-bids-run-new-schools; see also LAUSD School Board Chooses Most
Local Parent/Teacher Plans, UNITED TEACHERS L.A. (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.utla.net
/node/2758; see also Hu, supra note 71.
74 Peggy Walsh-Sarnecki, DPS Tries Something New: A School Run by Teachers, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, July 8, 2010, at A1; Stephen Sawchuck, Teacher-Led School Innovates with
Student Regrouping, EDUC. WK., Jan. 19, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.edweek.org
/ew/articles/2011/01/19/17schedule_ep.h30.html.
75 Beth Hawkins, Teacher Cooperatives: What Happens When Teachers Run the School?, 9
EDUC. NEXT 37, 40 (2009), available at http://educationnext.org/teacher-cooperatives/ (dis-
cussing “11 teacher-governed schools” within Milwaukee public school system).
76 Mission, Values and History, BOS. TEACHERS UNION SCH., http://theunionschool.com/wp
/about-the-school/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); see also What’s Working: BTU School, BOS.
TEACHERS UNION, http://www.btu.org/whats-working/btu-school (last visited Mar. 13,
2014).
77 BRICK ACAD., http://bricknewark.org/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). See also Hu, supra
note 71.
78 MINN. NEW COUNTRY SCH., http://www.newcountryschool.com (last visited Mar. 13,
2014). The New Country School was apparently among the first public schools to be organ-
ized as a teacher-governed entity. See Doug Thomas, MCNS History, MINN. NEW COUNTRY
SCH., http://www.newcountryschool.com/about-mncs/mncs-history (last visited Mar. 13,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-2\NVJ208.txt unknown Seq: 14 30-APR-14 10:47
Spring 2014] SEWER SYNDICALISM 457
One false start in the direction of worker-run public services emerged in
New York City in 2010. The New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission
(“TLC”)79 announced a “Group Ride Vehicle Pilot Program,” under which pri-
vate commuter-van services would replace bus lines formerly operated by the
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA)80 in Brooklyn and Queens.81 Transit
Workers Union Local 100 (“Local 100”), which represents MTA bus drivers,
sought an injunction to halt the pilot program.82
Alongside its legal challenge, Local 100 also submitted a proposal to oper-
ate its own commuter-van service under the pilot program.83 The union’s plan
was to operate the service under a non-profit corporation, TWU Express, and to
hire laid-off bus drivers at prevailing union wages.84 The TLC appeared poised
to accept the Local 100 bid.85 However, shortly after the court denied Local
100’s request for an injunction,86 the union abandoned its plan to operate the
commuter-van service.87
2014); Hawkins, supra note 75, at 38. It is now part of a network of more than three dozen
teacher cooperative schools in ten states affiliated with EdVisions Cooperative. Network of
Schools, EDVISIONS SCHS., http://edvisionsschools.org/goto/Network_of_Schools (last vis-
ited Mar. 13, 2014).
79 The TLC is the city “agency responsible for licensing and regulating New York City’s
medallion (yellow) taxicabs, for-hire vehicles (community-based liveries and black cars),
commuter vans, paratransit vehicles (ambulettes) and certain luxury limousines.” About
TLC, NYC TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/about
.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
80 The MTA is a public authority established by the State of New York to operate public
transportation in the New York City metropolitan region. The MTA Network: Public Trans-
portation for the New York Region, MTA, http://www.mta.info/mta/network.htm (last visited
Mar. 18, 2014). The MTA’s New York City Transit division operates subway and bus ser-
vices within the city. Id. 
81 Samuelson v. Yassky, 911 N.Y.S.2d 570, 573 (Sup. Ct. 2010); Aaron Rutkoff, Transit
Union to Run Vans It Opposes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, at A18, available at http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704164904575421702343430886.
82 Samuelson, 911 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
83 Ari Paul, TWU Ready to Give Dollar Vans a Ride for the Money: Plan to Offer Competi-
tion, CHIEF-LEADER, Aug. 13, 2010, available at http://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of
_the_week/twu-ready-to-give-dollar-vans-a-ride-for-the/article_08c07d34-3885-5063-8017
-7581d0e33d60.html?mode=image&photo=0; Rutkoff, supra note 81; Proposal, Transp.
Workers Union of Greater N.Y. Local 100 & TWU Local 100 Express, Group Vehicle Ride
Program, NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission [hereinafter TWU Proposal] (unpublished
manuscript) (copy on file with author). The Local 100 bid provided the initial impetus for
this paper. The original plan had been to use Local 100’s operation of a commuter van
service as a case study in public service syndicalism. As often happens with the best-laid
schemes, this one went awry, as Local 100’s plan never became a reality.
84 Paul, supra note 83; Rutkoff, supra note 81; TWU Proposal, supra note 83, at 1, 3–4.
85 Lisa Chow, Laid Off MTA Bus Drivers Win License to Operate Dollar Vans in Brooklyn,
WNYC NEWS (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.wnyc.org/story/90753-laid-mta-bus-drivers-win
-license-operate-dollar-van-service-brooklyn/; Rutkoff, supra note 81.
86 Samuelson, 911 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
87 Benjamin Kabak, TLC Commuter Van Pilot to Launch Monday Sans TWU, 2ND AVE.
SAGAS (Sept. 9, 2010), http://secondavenuesagas.com/2010/09/09/tlc-commuter-van-pilot
-to-launch-monday-sans-twu/. The union’s change of heart was apparently motivated by the
MTA’s rehiring of the laid-off bus drivers, as well as concerns about the financial viability
of the plan, and internal disagreement over whether operating a private van service was
appropriate for a union representing public transit workers. See Ari Paul, TWU Sends Dol-
lar-Van Plan to Scrap Heap, Citing Start-Up Costs, CHIEF-LEADER, Sept. 17, 2010, availa-
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2. Public Service Syndicalism in Civil War Spain
A dramatic example of worker control in public services occurred during
the Spanish Civil War (1936–39). In Barcelona and the surrounding region,
workers assumed control over what had been privately-owned commercial and
industrial enterprises, including (but by no means limited to) those engaged in
public utilities and services.88 These included water, gas, and electric utilities;89
telephone services;90 railways,91 ports,92 and municipal transit;93 health ser-
vices;94 and even hairdressing shops.95
Despite its historical significance, the Spanish experience—emerging
under the extreme circumstances of wartime, and brought about spontaneously
by a working class with a deep and rich anarchist and syndicalist tradition—
might appear to have limited precedential value in the very different conditions
of the United States today. A more recent case, in a social and economic con-
text more closely resembling our own, offers better support for the premise that
it may be feasible to implement some form of worker self-management in pub-
lic services here.
3. Public Service Mutuals in Great Britain
In 2010, the British government launched a new program of “mutualiza-
tion,” under which public service workers would assume managerial responsi-
bility from government authorities. The initiative began with a pilot program
under which management of selected service entities was transferred from pub-
lic authorities to employee-controlled “Pathfinder mutuals.”96 The pilot entities
ble at http://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of_the_week/twu-sends-dollar-van-plan-to
-scrap-heap-citing-start/article_5998e3e7-47a3-52b7-8fe3-5f74e62bc15c.html.
88 GASTON LEVAL, COLLECTIVES IN THE SPANISH REVOLUTION 227 (1975); Augustin
Souchy, Collectivizations in Catalonia, reprinted in THE ANARCHIST COLLECTIVES: WORK-
ERS’ SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE SPANISH REVOLUTION 1936–1939, supra note 55 at 86, 86
[hereinafter Collectivizations]; Augustin Souchy, Workers’ Self-Management in Industry,
reprinted in THE ANARCHIST COLLECTIVES: WORKERS’ SELF-MANAGEMENT IN THE SPANISH
REVOLUTION 1936–1939, supra note 55 at 78, 78, 82 [hereinafter Self-Management in Indus-
try]. In many cases, the workers simply took over operations after the private owners and
their managers fled in the wake of fighting. Self-Management in Industry, supra, at 78.
LEVAL, supra, at 246 offers a “piquant” anecdote involving assumption of control by work-
ers at the Barcelona tramway system, which had been owned by the General Tramways
Company:
All the top level personnel had left, and the syndical delegation found in the offices only the
lawyer instructed to represent the company and to parley with them. . . . [The company’s lawyer]
received [the delegation] most cordially, declaring that he accepted the new situation, and even
that, as a lawyer, he was putting himself at the service of the workers.
89 LEVAL, supra note 88, at 240; Collectivizations, supra note 88, at 91. R
90 Collectivizations, supra note 88, at 88. R
91 LEVAL, supra note 88, at 253–54; Collectivizations, supra note 88, at 89. R
92 LEVAL, supra note 88, at 264; Collectivizations, supra note 88, at 90–91.
93 LEVAL, supra note 88, at 245; Collectivizations, supra note 88, at 86.
94 LEVAL, supra note 88, at 264.
95 Collectivizations, supra note 88, at 93.
96 Press Release, Cabinet Office, Francis Maude Launches Pathfinder Mutuals (Aug. 12,
2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/francis-maude-launches-pathfind
er-mutuals.
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“cover a wide variety of sectors, including health, social care, youth services,
school support services and further education.”97
The stated motivation for the program was to “challenge traditional public
service structures and unleash the pent-up ideas and innovation that has been
stifled by bureaucracy.”98 The hope was that the mutual model would “liberate
public sector workers and ‘introduce radical shifts in ownership, accountability
and financing.’”99 Proponents anticipated that the change would lead to
enhanced service quality for users,100 and enhanced working experiences for
employees.101
Despite the vaunted benefits for workers, the mutualization plan came
under fire from labor unions representing public service employees. In response
to the government’s announcement of the Pathfinder Mutual program, one
union leader asserted, “There is no appetite from the public sector workforce or
the public generally for these so-called co-operatives. It is insulting to think
that these DIY co-operatives, set up on the cheap, can replace a well-estab-
lished and joined-up public sector.”102 In particular, these critics were unper-
suaded by the analogy to employee co-operatives in the commercial sector.
To think that cancer treatment can be equated with the values of the retail
sector beggers belief. And to keep repeating the words ‘John Lewis’ as the
reasoning for these changes is just mangling and perverting the English lan-
guage. You go to John Lewis to buy a sofa or a fridge, not to have
chemotherapy.103
Dismissing claims that the initiative would promote service enhancements
and worker autonomy, another union leader contended that, “[t]he coalition’s
resort to mutuals as an alternative to directly provided public services is largely
an attempt to save money on reduced pay, conditions, and pensions.”104
97 MUTUALS INFORMATION SERVICE, CABINET OFFICE, MUTUAL PATHFINDER PROGRESS
REPORT: DECEMBER 2011 2–3 (2011), available at http://mutuals.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/docu
ments/mutual-pathfinder-progress-report (listing 22 Pathfinder mutuals). See also JULIAN LE
GRAND, MUTUALS TASK FORCE, PUBLIC SERVICE MUTUALS: THE NEXT STEPS 22–28 (2012),
available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/44579 (discussing public service mutuals established
between 2010 and 2012).
98 Patrick Wintour, Public Sector Workers Encouraged to form John Lewis-style Co-opera-
tives, GUARDIAN, Nov. 17, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics
/2010/nov/17/public-sector-workers-cooperatives-mutuals (quoting Cabinet Office minister
Francis Maude).
99 Id. (quoting Francis Maude).
100 See, e.g., TIM COOPER, ACCENTURE INST. FOR HIGH PERFORMANCE, THE BENEFIT IS
MUTUALS: HARNESSING OLD MODELS OF PUBLIC VALUE IN A NEW AGE OF AUSTERITY 3
(2012), available at http://www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-
The-Benefit-is-Mutuals-Pov.pdf (citing “improve[d] . . . quality of public services”); LE
GRAND, supra note 97, at 3 (citing increased productivity, innovation, effectiveness, and R
efficiency as benefits for service users and communities).
101 See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 100 (citing greater engagement and motivation as benefits R
for employees in mutuals); LE GRAND, supra note 97, at 3 (citing improved “well-being,” R
“satisfaction,” and “working conditions” as benefits for employees).
102 Wintour, supra note 98 (quoting Unite joint general secretary Tony Woodley).
103 Id.
104
 Kate Murray, State of Emergency: Will Employee-Owned Co-Operatives Be Equipped
to Provide Efficient Public Services?, GUARDIAN, Apr. 20, 2011, at 3, available at http://
www.theguardian.com/society/2011/apr/19/mutuals-take-over-public-services (quoting
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For such opponents, the mutualization policy represents little more than an
effort to mask Thatcherism with a cooperative face. Behind the rhetoric of
social enterprise and worker empowerment they see the same project of dis-
mantling what remains of the welfare state and demolishing what remains of
the trade union movement.105
Indeed, the Big Society program has roots in efforts, dating back to the
1980s, to identify “alternatives to the central state as the supplier of various
types of public goods.”106 On the political right, a key proponent was British
Conservative Party figure James Douglas, who argued for increasing the role of
the so-called “Third Sector” as an alternative to state provision, favored by the
social-democratic left, and for-profit enterprise, favored by then-dominant
strands of the New Right.107 He specifically identified “mutual associations”
among the Third Sector organizations that could replace government as provid-
ers of benefits and services.108 In this sense, the turn from privatization to
mutualization does not represent a repudiation of Thatcherism, so much as a
continuation of its core project—disabling “source[s] of countervailing power
in the state”109—by other means.110
Labor opposition also reflected concerns about the material impact of
mutualization on pay, benefits, and job security for service workers. Specifi-
cally, while pensions for existing workers will be unaffected by the move from
Heather Wakefield, head of local government for Unison, a health and local government
workers union).
105 See Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Rise of the Social
Market Economy, 16 SOCIALIST REG. 1, 14–16 (1979) (discussing “the political onslaught on
social democracy and its main organizational support, the trade unions” as a key element of
neo-liberal ideology and policy); Alan Ware, The Big Society and Conservative Politics:
Back to the Future or Forward to the Past?, 82 POL. Q. 82, 83–84 (2011) (noting the
Thatcher government’s goal of “tr[ying] to reduce the power of a whole range of intermedi-
ate organisations,” including unions).
106 Ware, supra note 105, at 82.
107 Id.
108 Id. See also Johnston Birchall, The Big Society and the ‘Mutualisation’ of Public Ser-
vices: A Critical Commentary, 82 POL. Q. 145, 145–46 (2012) (“[T]he idea of devolving
provision of public services to organisations owned variously by employees, service users
and local communities has been on the political agenda since the mid-1980s under the previ-
ous Conservative government headed by Margaret Thatcher and then by John Major.”). The
“New Labour” government of the 1990s also embraced a “new mutualism” under which
control of formerly-nationalized services was transferred to non-governmental bodies with
employee participation. Id. at 145–46 (discussing community-employee trusts in healthcare
and leisure services); Jane Wills, A Stake in Place? The Geography of Employee Ownership
and Its Implications for a Stakeholding Society, 23 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRA-
PHERS 79, 79, 81 (1998) (discussing employee and employee-management buyouts in coal,
bus, and railway maintenance sectors).
109 Ware, supra note 105, at 85; Gamble, supra note 105, at 14–16, 19–20 (noting impor-
tance to the neo-liberal “social market strategy” of action by the Thatcherite “strong state” to
“intimidate and demoralize the labour movement, so weaking its political opposition”).
110 Indeed, at least some mutualization advocates recognized that “the perception that sup-
porting the transition to the mutuals model constitutes privatization via another route” repre-
sented a potential political threat to the government’s program. COOPER, supra note 100, at 6
(warning that “the competitive dynamics of the market in which [mutuals] are operating may
be complicated by government attempts . . . to protect smaller players from acquisition by
larger incumbents for political reasons”).
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government employment to the mutual setting, new employees will not enjoy
such protection.111 In addition, without policies and practices in place to ensure
access to capital, cultivation of management capacities, and other supportive
resources, there are concerns about the ability of employee mutuals to survive
in competition with larger, better-capitalized market participants.112
V. TOWARD A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC SERVICE SYNDICALISM
Radical forms of worker control “tend to arise ‘spontaneously,’ without
conscious preparation.”113
Historically, worker control emerges in the wake of a “major crisis”
through the autonomous effort of workers already exhibiting “a high level of
independent organization.”114 The case of worker-run public services in Civil
War-era Spain exemplifies this pattern.
Yet, the case of public service mutuals in Britain suggests the possibility
of promoting some form of worker self-management in public services through
deliberate policy and legal intervention. The British case further suggests that
experiments in worker-controlled public services may be politically feasible in
the United States as well.
A legal framework to promote worker self-management in public services
could entail a mix of preferences in favor of worker-run service contractors,
along with educational and training programs, and financial support for worker-
run entities. This framework draws on existing policy in the area of government
contracts, as well as past practices and proposed legislation aimed at supporting
worker ownership in the manufacturing sector.
When contracting for goods and services, government at the federal, state,
and local levels commonly grants preferences in favor of certain bidders to
promote social policy goals. Preferences in favor of small businesses—predi-
cated on beliefs about the significance of small business for maintaining a
“competitive free-enterprise system,” promoting entrepreneurship and innova-
111
 Birchall, supra note 108, at 155; but see LE GRAND, supra note 97, at 14 (citing “US
evidence” that “employee-owners generally do not sacrifice pay or benefits . . . and . . . are
more likely . . . to have diversified retirement plans”).
112 Birchall, supra note 108, at 155–56; COOPER, supra note 100, at 6; JONATHAN BLAND,
CO-OPERATIVES UK, TIME TO GET SERIOUS: INTERNATIONAL LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING
PUBLIC SERVICE MUTUALS 19–22 (2011) (discussing importance of access to capital, suc-
cessful organizational models, and other forms of legal and logistical support as factors in
success of public service mutuals, and noting that “[t]he UK policy context does not emerge
particularly well from the comparison with” similar programs in other European countries);
LE GRAND, supra note 97, at 20–21, 33–34 (describing “Social Enterprise Investment Fund”
and “Mutuals Support Programme” intended to support financial and human capital capaci-
ties of new mutuals and recommending further efforts in that regard).
113 Cohen, supra note 58, at 54. By way of example, Cohen cites the emergence of workers
councils during the events of May 1968 in France, a development that was “spontaneous in
the sense that the official parties and unions never took the initiative.” Id. (quoting Daniel
Singer).
114 Gluckstein, supra note 58.
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tion, and spurring job creation115—are well established and enjoy substantial
popular support.116 Preferences in favor of minority- or female-owned busi-
nesses have been used as a tool for promoting equal economic opportunity.117
State and municipal governments grant preferences for businesses that are
locally-based or employ local residents, to foster the development and stability
of local economies.118
In similar fashion, state and local governments could enact preferences in
favor of worker-controlled entities when contracting for public services.119
Indeed, such preference would also advance the same policy goals underlying
existing preferences for small, local, and minority- or female-owned busi-
nesses. By their nature, public service syndicates would be locally-based small
enterprises, employing local residents, because “women and African Americans
constitute a disproportionately large share of the state and local public-sector
workforce,”120 policies favoring public service syndicates would also promote
affirmative action goals. At the same time, unlike traditional preferences, pub-
lic service syndicalism would also promote workplace democracy and worker
empowerment.
Another way to support worker self-management in public services is
through education and outreach to raise awareness of this model among work-
ers and the general public, and technical assistance for workers starting or run-
115 Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Down-Sizing the “Little Guy” Myth in Legal Definitions, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 1041, 1048–60 (2013) (discussing common justifications for policies favoring small
business).
116 See id. at 1078 (“The U.S. government has a long-established policy favoring small
business by preferentially allocating government contracts to such entities.”); Max V.
Kidalov, Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative
Assessment, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 443, 445–46 (2011) (“Throughout the twentieth and the
early twenty-first centuries, the United States has been a global leader in small business-
friendly procurement policies.”).
117 See Clark D. Cunningham et al., Passing Strict Scrutiny: Using Social Science to Design
Affirmative Action Programs, 90 GEO. L.J. 835, 841–42 (2002).
118 See Norman R. Williams, Taking Care of Ourselves: State Citizenship, the Market, and
the State, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 493–99 (2008) (offering an “investment capture” theory in
support of resident preferences in government procurement policies).
119 See United States Employee Ownership Bank Act, S. 3419, 112th Cong. § 5 (2012)
(amending the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102, to
grant employees a “right of first refusal” to acquire a facility slated for closing). The US
Employee Ownership Bank Act and the Worker Ownership, Readiness, and Knowledge Act
(“WORK Act”), were introduced by Sen. Bernard Sanders (I-VT) to promote worker owner-
ship and control in the private sector. Senator Sanders Introduces Bills to Support Employee
Ownership, VT. EMP. OWNERSHIP CENTER, www.veoc.org/node/68 (last visited Mar. 13,
2014). Both bills died in committee. S. 3419 (112th): United States Employee Ownership
Bank Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3419 (last visited
Mar. 13, 2014); S. 3421 (112th): WORK Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/con
gress/bills/112/s3421 (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). The prospects of enacting such legislation
at the federal level are exceedingly dim. However, these bills offer an instructive model for
potential state legislation or municipal ordinances to promote worker self-management in
public services.
120 DAVID COOPER ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER NO. 339, THE PUBLIC-SEC-
TOR JOBS CRISIS: WOMEN AND AFRICAN AMERICANS HIT HARDEST BY JOB LOSSES IN STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 2 (2012), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/bp339
-public-sector-jobs-crisis/.
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ning public service syndicates. At least in the early stages, state and local
governments can provide these resources, either directly or through grants to
non-governmental organizations.121 As with contracting preferences, this
would not represent a radically new policy or government role, but rather a
refocusing of existing programs to include support for worker-controlled enter-
prises. As a network of public service syndicates develops, they will be able to
take on this role themselves, sharing information and advice based on their own
experiences.
Government can also provide direct loans, loan guarantees, or other forms
of financial assistance for public service syndicates.122 Once again, there is
precedent for this government role, for example in government programs that
provide start-up loans for small businesses.123 Indeed, state and local govern-
ments have facilitated worker buyouts of private firms through loans and loan
guarantees.124
Finally, tax law represents another vehicle by which government can sup-
port worker self-management in public services. Federal and state governments
can offer tax incentives for transferring managerial control125 in existing enti-
ties to workers,126 and accord preferential tax treatment for public service
syndicates.
121 See Worker Ownership, Readiness, and Knowledge Act or WORK Act, S. 3421, 112th
Cong. §§ 2(c)(1)–(2), (d) (2012) (establishing program within US Department of Labor to
provide education, outreach, technical assistance, and training to support the creation of
worker-owned enterprises, and providing for grants to fund such efforts).
122 See United States Employee Ownership Bank Act, S. 3419, 112th Cong. § 4 (2012)
(establishing a unit within the US Treasury Department to provide loans for employee
buyouts of existing private firms).
123 See, e.g., SBA Loan Programs, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/loan
programs (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
124 See DOW, supra note 40, at 9; JOHN G. RAPPA, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OFF. LEGIS.
RES., EMPLOYEE BUYOUT FINANCING (2002), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2002/rpt
/2002-R-0643.htm (reviewing financial and technical support by federal, state, and local
governments for employee buyouts); Ohio Employee Ownership Center, Shutdowns,
Buyouts, and Jobs: It’s Time to Recognize Employee and Community Rights, OWNERS AT
WORK, Summer 1997, at 1–6 (“[P]ublic sector loans, loan guarantees, and/or interest rate
buydowns have been key to the success of more than 20 employee buyouts that averted
shutdowns in [Ohio].”); Loan Guarantee Approved for Buyout of Maine Clothier, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, May 2, 1991, at 20 (reporting on loan guarantee provided by Finance Author-
ity of Maine for employee buyout).
125 The proposal here is agnostic on the question of ownership as distinct from managerial
control. Ownership of assets might remain in government hands, which would alleviate one
of the common impediments to acquisition by workers. Alternatively, assets might be owned
by a form of community trust. See Casebeer, supra note 4, at 10–11. Or workers might
acquire the assets, in which case a cooperative structure, rather than one based on individual
share ownership, would be preferable. See DOW, supra note 40, at 73.
126 See I.R.C. § 4975(e)(7) (2012) (defining “employee stock ownership plan”); I.R.C.
§ 409 (2012) (establishing “[q]ualifications for tax credit employee stock ownership plans”).
See DOW, supra note 40, at 76–83. Proponents have commonly cited economic democracy
and broader wealth distribution as justifications for according favorable legal treatment to
ESOPs. See Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 TAX L. REV. 363, 366 (1990);
Sean M. Anderson, Risky Retirement Business: How ESOPs Harm the Workers They Are
Supposed to Help, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 23 (2009). Anderson observes that more recent
arguments in favor of ESOPs emphasize enhanced worker satisfaction, reduced labor-man-
agement conflict, and increased productivity, rather than economic democracy and equality.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the current US political climate, the prospects of implementing a robust
form of public service syndicalism will surely appear remote.127 Yet, the exam-
ple of Britain suggests that at least measured steps in that direction might be
politically feasible here. Particularly at the state and municipal levels, there
may be opportunities to engage in “novel social and economic experiments”128
with worker-run public services. Through such experimentation, public services
under worker control can serve as demonstration projects to promote workplace
democracy and worker empowerment more broadly.
Anderson, supra, at 25. Because ESOPs do not necessarily entail majority ownership by
employees, nor confer management rights to worker-owners, proponents of worker control
regard them as limited at best. See DOW, supra note 40, at 81; Casebeer, supra note 4, at 7.
Despite their limitations as an approach to worker control, however, ESOPs do highlight the
possibility of using tax law as an instrument for encouraging alternative organizational
forms.
127 See Running Government Like a Business, supra note 32, at 56 (commenting on the
limited probability of success of more modest proposals to enhance “employee voice” within
the existing framework of capitalist business organizations); Casebeer, supra note 4, at 8
(“[T]he ascendency of the political Right under the banner of the ‘Tea-Party’ in local and
state government currently in the United States probably makes Community Syndicalism a
political impossibility.”).
128 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
